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Abstract
The lack of global consensus on how to deal with complex energy governance challenges has led to the emergence
of information disclosure initiatives as governance tools in and of themselves. This article assesses the effectiveness of
disclosure mechanisms as tools of energy governance by looking at the motivations and desired outcomes behind a
series of disclosure-based initiatives in the energy sector, namely: making energy markets work more efﬁciently;
inducing corporations to internalize their climate change externalities; and improving democratic processes that lead
to better energy governance outcomes. The disclosure initiatives assessed in this article adopt different strategies to
achieve their objectives, mobilizing either users of information or holders of information, with varying effectiveness.
Where pressures for secrecy exist, voluntary disclosures without formal sanctions to incentivize compliance have
limited impact. Where users of information are primarily mobilized as drivers of change, the disclosures have to be
easily understood to have impact; this is no easy task when it comes to the energy sector. Disclosure mechanisms
that use a strategy of engagement and building of wide networks have perhaps the best potential to inﬂuence (or
pressure) holders of information to change their behavior accordingly. However, disclosure mechanisms underpinned
by western-inﬂuenced values of governmental transparency may not be as effective in countries that lack democratic
systems.
Policy Implications
• Disclosure is not an alternative to regulation; it is a different form of regulation, one that can be carried out to some
extent on a voluntary and self-regulatory basis.
• Disclosure mechanisms that aim to mobilize users of information as drivers of change have to provide information
that is easily understood by them.
• Disclosure mechanisms that use a strategy of engagement and building of wide networks have the best potential
to inﬂuence (or pressure) holders of information to change their behavior accordingly.
• Disclosure mechanisms underpinned by western-inﬂuenced values of governmental transparency may not be as
effective in countries that lack democratic systems.
Information ﬂows are a key component of governance in
all sectors and at all levels, key to regulatory effective-
ness and efﬁciency, governmental accountability and the
curbing of corruption. So much of governance reform
consists of efforts to increase those ﬂows that one
author has referred to transparency as ‘the Swiss Army
knife of policy tools’, called for in everything from ﬁnan-
cial regulation to conﬂict resolution (Hauﬂer, 2010,
p. 55). Given the considerable problems with national
and global-level energy governance explored throughout
this special issue, it is not surprising that we ﬁnd infor-
mation disclosure initiatives emerging throughout the
energy sector to address various governance challenges.
Notably, these initiatives are not just intended to
improve existing governance systems such as regula-
tions, but to serve as governance tools in and of them-
selves.
The emergence of such information disclosure initia-
tives results directly from the lack of global consensus
on how to deal with complex energy governance chal-
lenges, particularly with regards to regulations on cli-
mate change and energy markets. The continued
absence of clear international regulation on climate
change despite the many years of negotiations, for
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instance, has led to governance gaps. And geopolitical
pressures to secure ﬁnite energy supplies have led to
untransparent energy market practices; oil price volatility
only compounds the lack of transparency in the energy
market, a serious market failure (for more on this, see
Dubash and Florini, this issue). Information disclosure
initiatives, driven by government regulatory agencies,
international organizations and ⁄or civil society organ-
izations, aim to ﬁll such gaps and correct market and
governance failures by providing more effective gover-
nance in the absence of organizational coherence or
institutional reform in global energy governance. This is
not an easy task, especially when it comes to the energy
sector, where secrecy often tends to prevail.
This article discusses how disclosure mechanisms are
meant to function as tools of energy governance by
looking at the primary motivations and desired gover-
nance outcomes behind a series of transparency initia-
tives. These include: making energy markets work more
efﬁciently; inducing corporations to internalize their cli-
mate change externalities; and improving democratic
processes that lead to better energy governance out-
comes. The article explores several of these initiatives to
assess their effectiveness as a partial global energy gov-
ernance solution to existing governance gaps and mar-
ket failures. Uses of disclosure to make markets work
better include the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI); uses of
disclosure to spur corporations to internalize climate
change externalities include the Global Reporting Initia-
tive (GRI), and various carbon emissions disclosure initia-
tives, as well as requirements that corporations disclose
climate-related risks as part of their normal reporting;
and uses of disclosure to improve democratic processes
for better energy governance outcomes include the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Elec-
tricity Governance Initiative.
Information disclosure as an energy
governance tool
The energy sector, opaque and riddled with market and
governance inefﬁciencies, has proven both particularly
susceptible to the problems engendered by information
asymmetries and particularly resistant to pressures for
greater disclosure. Markets require substantial informa-
tion ﬂows to function efﬁciently, but the information
available is never complete. Nobel Prizes in economics
have been awarded for work showing the powerful
effects of information asymmetries and imperfections on
the functioning of markets, providing an important
explanation for why markets do not necessarily clear.
Participants in markets always face incomplete informa-
tion on matters that are absolutely critical to the deci-
sions they need to make – what will be the returns on
various investment projects, which are the best workers
to hire, what is the quality of goods on the market?
Obtaining the requisite information has costs, so that in
a sense there is a market for information embedded
within all other markets (Stiglitz, 2001). Often, the rele-
vant information has the character of a public good –
for it to be useful for efﬁcient market functioning, it has
to be available to all. And like all such goods, it will
engender free-rider problems that imply that it will be
underprovided. Thus, ensuring that sufﬁcient information
is available for energy markets to function well can
require governance in the form of enforceable agree-
ments among market participants.
Information ﬂows are also important in improving gov-
ernance processes, from the delivery of energy services to
the development of robust public policies, and the curb-
ing of governmental corruption. Information disclosure in
this context entails making available government-held
energy-related information so as to enable citizens to
oversee and assess governmental decisions and to make
informed choices, thereby empowering them. Citizens so
empowered are able to provide feedback to government
on proposed energy policies or reforms that would affect
them; this helps improve public receptivity and increases
the likelihood that the policies developed are more effec-
tive in the long run. A signiﬁcant number of energy
resource-rich states are poor with weak governance struc-
tures, leaving their public sectors susceptible to corrup-
tion. Information disclosure has long been touted as the
sunlight that can best disinfect public sectors.
Given the lack of enforceable international agreements
on energy issues, a host of disclosure initiatives are now
attempting to shed new light on key energy-related data
and thereby directly or indirectly change behavior. For
the purposes of this article, we have identiﬁed three main
motivations and desired governance outcomes that drive
disclosure initiatives in the energy sector: (1) making mar-
kets work more efﬁciently; (2) inducing corporations to
internalize negative externalities; and (3) improving dem-
ocratic processes for better energy governance outcomes.
Below, we examine cases in all three categories.
In the market-efﬁciency category, the most striking
transparency initiative deals with oil markets which are
notorious for their opacity. Oil price volatility and market
instability, which serve neither producer nor consumer
interests, are partly attributed to inadequate and inaccu-
rate oil data and information. JODI encourages partici-
pating states to disclose information voluntarily on oil
reserves, among other data, with the rationale that such
disclosure serves the common interest of enabling efﬁ-
cient oil market functioning by making relevant data eas-
ily available. As we will show, the common interest is
not necessarily sufﬁcient to overcome incentives for con-
tinued opacity.
The failure to reach a climate change agreement has
led disparate groups – for example, institutional
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145
Global Policy (2011) 2:SI ª 2011 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
investors and shareholders, environmental activists and
some corporations – to forge alliances geared toward
the goal of inducing corporations to internalize climate
change externalities. The resulting initiatives aim to
regulate corporate and sometimes government behav-
ior via targeted disclosure demands. The strategy of
such disclosure-based initiatives is to mobilize enough
willing and high-proﬁle corporations to disclose rele-
vant information, creating competitive pressures for
other corporations to follow suit. The hope is that
publicizing the information reported (or lack of forth-
coming disclosures) by corporations through the dis-
closure initiatives will mobilize environmentally
conscious consumers to make discerning choices that
might affect business proﬁtability. Corporations that
willingly report would thus have a competitive advan-
tage, potentially motivating other corporations to get
on board. But more importantly, the process of disclo-
sure encourages corporations to internalize their nega-
tive climate change externalities. When corporations
are faced with information about their own damaging
business operations and practices, they may willingly
change those practices, possibly to reduce waste or to
mitigate reputational risks.
Examples of such disclosure-based strategies include
the GRI, which promotes voluntary guidelines for cor-
porate sustainability reporting, and the Carbon Disclo-
sure Project (CDP), where participating corporations
can voluntarily report on their greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, a key externality of fossil fuel-based energy
systems. A more direct method of getting corporations
to internalize climate change externalities is by playing
the ‘shame’ card. For example, the Carbon Monitoring
for Action (CARMA) independently provides estimated
carbon emissions data on power plants around the
world via a public database ranking the facilities
according to their emissions levels. This disclosure
mechanism only mobilizes the users of the disclosed
information without need for engaging the holders of
the information.
Disclosure initiatives aimed at improving democratic
processes for better energy governance outcomes have
targeted the electricity sector and the extractive indus-
tries. Disclosure initiatives with such an aim function by
mobilizing citizens with information. The Electricity Gov-
ernance Initiative (EGI) and the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) broadly aim to empower cit-
izens by providing them with access to government-held
information. The EGI aims to use disclosure about pro-
posed electricity sector reforms to facilitate citizens’ par-
ticipation in decision making by increasing their
awareness of the proposed policies that could affect
them, thereby creating motivation for citizens to provide
feedback to the government. Under the EITI, information
about payments from the extractive industries to
governments of the countries in which they operate is
intended to enhance citizens’ ability to hold their gov-
ernment accountable.
Making oil markets more efficient
In the market-efﬁciency category, the most striking initia-
tive deals with oil. The oil market is notoriously known
for its untransparent practices. Instances of oil price vola-
tility and market instability are partly attributed to inade-
quate and inaccurate oil data and information; because
there is no enforceable mechanism that requires states
to reveal their oil data, a disclosure initiative here would
have to appeal to states on the basis of addressing a
common need, that is, enabling efﬁcient oil market func-
tioning through availability of easily accessible transpar-
ent data for all market participants. JODI is driven by
this rationale. But not all states are motivated to be
transparent in order to ensure a stable and efﬁcient oil
market; some states may stand to gain by being untrans-
parent, in the short term at least, as later sections will
show.
Many countries have long deﬁned ensuring national
energy security as synonymous with securing uninter-
rupted access to oil and other fossil fuels at affordable
prices. But attempts dating back to the 1970s by the
oil-consuming countries to stabilize the oil market
(Florini, this issue) have often failed to head off extra-
ordinary oil price volatility. Extreme oil price ﬂuctua-
tions can have signiﬁcant effects for the economy.
Since the Second World War, oil price spikes occurred
before the onset of ten of the United States’ eleven
recessions (Hamilton, 2010). Oil-producing countries too
have incentives in seeing stable oil prices. Unpredict-
able prices create uncertainty, which discourages invest-
ment in the oil industry, driving capital to sectors
where the returns are higher (Naimi, 2005).
Lack of reliable and clear data on oil market supply
and demand contributes to the volatility, although cer-
tainly other factors are also at play. Other reasons cited
have included oil cartel- induced production limits or
‘artiﬁcial supply’ limitations caused by governmental pol-
icy (Kröger, 2006). Events such as wars, regional conﬂicts
in or near oil-producing countries, natural disasters or
oil-production accidents that seemingly threaten oil sup-
plies can also lead to sudden oil price spikes based on
fears of oil shortages (Johnson, 2008). Yet it is clear that
greater transparency on oil market data could help pre-
vent or dampen extreme oil price gyrations.
A bout of volatile oil price ﬂuctuations in the late
1990s led to increased calls to promote transparency in
oil market data at the International Energy Forum (IEF),
where energy ministers meet every two years. The IEF
was formed in 1991 primarily to promote dialogue
between the oil-producing and consuming countries (IEF
Ann Florini and Saleena Saleem
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members account for 90 per cent of the global oil and
supply demand). While transparency was not an outright
goal of the IEF at the time it was created, it was impli-
citly recognized as being necessary, in that the increased
dialogue was aimed at building trust between partici-
pants on the sensitive topic of oil, thereby enhancing
global energy security. And trust was impossible to
achieve with a dearth of information. Nevertheless, the
IEF was not regarded as a source of oil information;
instead, that job went to the International Energy
Agency (IEA).
However, despite the IEA’s reputation as a legitimate
source of reliable oil information, it has revised its oil
data estimations, causing confusion among market par-
ticipants. In 1999, the IEA made corrections to its num-
bers ranging between 7 and 20 per cent, leading one
scholar to question ‘whether the [oil] price panics of
1999 were partly caused by the IEA’ (Tempest, 2001,
p. 342). Regardless of the merits of such a viewpoint, the
reality is that the IEA’s oil data rely on oil data estima-
tions from governments that are often untimely, inaccu-
rate or secretive; such governmental information often
has to be referenced to secondary sources, which neces-
sitates IEA oil data revisions.
By the time Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi noted at
the Davos World Economic Forum in February 2001 that
the lack of transparency meant that there was ‘no true
consensus on consumption, oil stocks and production at
any given time’ (Khadduri, 2005), there was already
growing agreement that market stability would require
greater transparency on oil data. The IEF, in partnership
with six international organizations – Asia Paciﬁc Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC), Statistical Ofﬁce of the Euro-
pean Communities (Eurostat), IEA, Latin American Energy
Organization (OLADE), Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and United Nations Statistics
Division (UNSD) – then launched the Joint Oil Data Exer-
cise in 2001. The oil data reporting exercise aimed to
raise awareness of the need for transparency of reliable
oil data among the member countries of the institutions.
Member countries from these six institutions were given
standardized questionnaires and asked to report on their
monthly oil statistics. Within a year, the exercise had par-
ticipation from over 70 countries that constituted 90 per
cent of the global oil supply and demand (IEF, 2010).
The oil data reporting exercise was formalized into
the Joint Oil Data Initiative to collect and disseminate
reliable data on the oil market. Since 2005, the partici-
pation rate has increased to more than 90 countries,
and the information is now publicly available from an
online database. Emerging countries in the world
economy such as China and India, which have increas-
ing energy needs, but which fell outside the domain
of the IEA and OPEC, also participated in JODI. This
addition was particularly welcomed given the potential
impact of the two countries’ growing energy needs on
the oil markets. The data available online include par-
ticipating countries’ monthly data on ‘production,
demand, reﬁnery intake and output, closing stock lev-
els and stock changes across seven product categories
(crude oil, LPG, gasoline, kerosene, diesel oil, fuel oil
and total oil’ (Laan, 2010, p. 41).
JODI ﬁlls an information gap for users. There appears
to be some measure of success, in the sense that oil
market players seem to be increasingly aware of JODI.
For instance, according to the IEA, by 2010 more than
half of JODI’s online database users were ‘market ana-
lysts, compared to less than a quarter two years prior’
(JODI, 2010a).
But does JODI make markets more efﬁcient? JODI is
only useful when the data submitted to it by the
country participants (disclosers) are timely, accurate
and complete. While JODI publicized the fact that 90
countries were submitting data regularly in 2010 com-
pared to the 60 in 2008, a closer look at a recent
JODI data quality assessment for a six-month period
from July to December 2009 reveals an interesting
picture. Major players such as China, India and Russia
were assessed a rating of ‘fair’ for completeness of
data, meaning that they had submitted only 60 to 90
per cent of the data required by JODI (JODI, 2010b).
Clearly, there is substance to the IEA complaints lev-
eled at emerging countries like China over their lack
of transparency on oil data. For instance, in its July
2010 Oil Monthly Report, the IEA stated that it had
‘concerns about Chinese data (in terms of both qual-
ity and comprehensiveness, particularly regarding inde-
pendent reﬁning activity and stocks of crude and oil
products)’ (IEA, 2010). This lack of transparency is of
particular concern since China is set to surpass the
United States in being the world’s largest energy con-
sumer, if it has not already (Swartz and Oster, 2010).
There are also concerns over unreliable oil produc-
tion-and-demand ﬁgures from large oil producers
(Lynch and Baskin, 2010) which JODI appears unable to
resolve. For instance, OPEC oil producers use a quota
production system that is pegged to the size of their
crude oil reserves – the larger the reserves a country
reportedly has, the more it is allowed to produce and
sell, and thus make more money (Porter, 2005). Oil
reserves estimates for some OPEC countries such as
Kuwait and United Arab Emirates have not changed for
years. In 2006, the respected oil industry newsletter
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW) even claimed that
Kuwait had far less oil reserves (24 billion barrels of
proven reserves and 24 billion barrels of non-proven
reserves) than had been ofﬁcially reported by the
Kuwaiti government (99 billion barrels). Similarly, Saudi
Arabia’s reported oil reserves estimates have remained
at around 260 billion barrels for over 20 years despite
Disclosures in Global Energy Governance
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producing as much as 4 billion barrels a year (Reuters,
2010). The majority of oil reserves are held by countries
and major oil companies such as Shell, BP and Exxon
which do not allow independent veriﬁcations of the
size of their oilﬁelds. Such uncertainty over the reliabil-
ity of oil reserves data has given fuel to arguments by
peak oil theorists such as Matthew Simmons that world
oil reserves estimates are actually far lower than
reported (Markman, 2004). Since JODI receives its data
directly from the producing countries and given the
controversy on reliability of the ﬁgures reported by
some oil-producing countries, the JODI data inevitably
will be taken with a certain degree of skepticism by
their users.
Additionally, JODI has an uphill task in countering
the tendency for some big oil-consuming countries to
withhold information due to geopolitical concerns. For
instance, China’s growing needs for energy will make
it particularly vulnerable to oil price volatility in the
future. As part of its national energy security strategy,
China’s national oil companies are acquiring equity oil
stakes in foreign oil assets through foreign subsidiary
companies. The Chinese acquisitions activity increased
signiﬁcantly after the US invasion of Iraq, which was
widely regarded in China as a move fueled by US
desire to secure oil for its own needs (Christie et al.,
2010). The Chinese national oil companies report on
their activities within China, but their activities con-
ducted under foreign subsidiaries can sometimes fall
under the radar. However, the activities of the foreign
subsidiaries of Chinese national oil companies outside
Chinese borders will have a bearing on China’s overall
oil ﬁgures; in some cases some of the oil produced by
foreign subsidiaries can be taken for China’s own use.
How well JODI can account for oil data from such
activities remains to be seen. Further, as the US Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) noted,
there needs to be greater transparency on oil in tran-
sit (oil that is in transit to a destination or temporarily
stored at sea) data (CFTC, 2010). However, JODI
excludes oil in transit data (JODI, 2010c), and this
omission affects a true reﬂection of available oil
supplies.
The accuracy of the data submitted to JODI by the
smaller country participants is also in question due to
capacity constraints. Lack of trained statisticians, lack of
resources for data collecting and recording, or an inabil-
ity to implement reliable data collection standards can
affect the accuracy of data submitted even if the country
participants are amenable to JODI’s mission. To that end,
JODI partners organize workshops to train participant
countries on its standardized data collection methodolo-
gies.
In short, given the unreliable, inaccurate and incom-
plete data submissions by important country
participants, JODI at this point is a useful step, but not
yet a fully functional disclosure mechanism making mar-
kets function efﬁciently.
Corporate internalization of climate change
externalities
Corporate activities that harm the environment, such as
the release of greenhouse gases, and the impact of cli-
mate change risks on businesses’ proﬁtability, are worry-
ing issues for a variety of groups – environmentalists,
investors and shareholders and government regulators.
Such concerns have spurred such groups collaboratively
to devise innovative disclosure-based methods that aim
to pressure corporations into managing their climate
change externalities. At a minimum, having to disclose
the risks they face would raise companies’ awareness
and force them to consider what those risks might be
and whether they should be concerned about climate
policy. This process of reﬂection would also increase the
probability for companies to take proactive measures to
prepare for likely climate impacts on their businesses,
easing the process of adaptation. At best, such disclo-
sure mechanisms might induce companies to consider
their own contribution to the problem in the form of
company-generated emissions and ⁄or to push their
industry sector and governments to take effective large-
scale action.
It is not easy to design disclosure mechanisms that
can result in behavioral changes for both the users and
disclosers of information. A group of researchers at Har-
vard have investigated multiple cases and have derived
a set of good design criteria: (1) potential users of infor-
mation were making less than ideal choices about a
matter of public concern because they lacked informa-
tion; (2) potential users of information could and would
change their behavior if they had access to relevant and
comprehensible information; and (3) the changed behav-
ior of users would induce or incentivize the disclosers
via market or political pressures to, in turn, change their
own behavior in the direction targeted by the disclosure
mechanism (Weil et al., 2006).
For this to work, the information must be made avail-
able in a form that is relevant, comprehensive and read-
ily understood by its potential users. And those potential
users must care about what is revealed. Does anyone –
consumer, investor, citizen – care enough about compar-
ing corporate GHG emissions to invest time and
resources in mobilizing action in response to the disclo-
sures? Will consumers prefer to buy products produced
in less GHG-intensive ways? Will investors prefer to
invest in companies whose emissions are lower than
those of their competitors? Even a perfectly designed
disclosure mechanism is of little value unless the
Ann Florini and Saleena Saleem
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information revealed matters, a lot, to people who did
not previously have access to that information, and they
have the capacity to act in response.
Climate change impacts on corporations could take
several forms. First, corporations might face disruptions
to their labor force (e.g. from climate change-induced
migration), changes in water supplies or changes in the
availability of agricultural or other commodities. Second,
corporations could face signiﬁcant ﬁnancial costs in
meeting social or regulatory pressures to reduce their
GHG emissions, or be held responsible for damage from
previous emissions. Third, GHG-intensive corporations
could face increasing competition from alternative pro-
viders using new technologies or business models. In
general, corporations have not reported on how they
may be affected by the need to adapt to climate
change, or what steps they are taking to address such
risks, if any (GRI and KPMG, 2007). However, groups such
as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Econo-
mies (CERES), which represents both investors and
environmentalists, have argued that investors and
shareholders value businesses that ‘prepare for and capi-
talize on business opportunities posed by climate
change’ (Cogan, 2006, p. 1).
To that end, CERES ﬁrst conceived the idea of corpo-
rate disclosures on sustainability issues in 1997. It
devised the GRI to develop and spread guidelines for
corporate disclosures on sustainability reporting. Later,
CERES drew in the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) as a partner; this turned the GRI into a
global effort (Hill, 2007). Since its inception, the GRI has
focused on spreading its guidelines for the reporting of
economic, environmental and social performance (i.e.
ESG reporting) of businesses, governments and NGOs.1
To date, there are more than 1,300 businesses across the
world that disclose information, on a voluntary basis,
according to GRI guidelines (CERES, 2007).
The GRI is essentially a networked NGO-driven process
that has been very successful in bringing together other
actors. Its disclosure-based strategy involved creating a
reporting framework through dialogue and engagement
with a myriad of interest groups – corporations, civil
society, academics and professional institutions. Corpora-
tions issue sustainability reports using the GRI standard-
ized framework, and this information enables users (its
investors, for instance) to assess a corporation’s commit-
ment and performance on sustainability issues. GRI also
engages in partnerships with high-proﬁle institutions,
such as OECD and UNEP, and obtains input from govern-
ments through informal governmental advisory boards.
It also participates in dialogues with organizations
responsible for setting international business standards
and norms such as the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) and the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO). Through such engagements and networks,
GRI aims to increase the adoption of ESG reporting by
public regulators, moving from voluntary to mandatory.
In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis, the board of GRI has
explicitly called on governments to adopt policies that
require corporations to do ESG reporting and to inte-
grate them with their ﬁnancial reporting (GRI, 2009). This
strategy appears to be paying off. Sweden has mandated
GRI reporting by state-owned companies since 2007.
Denmark made nonﬁnancial ESG reporting mandatory
on a ‘comply or explain’ basis in 2009, and the Singa-
pore stock exchange issued a sustainability reporting
guidance for its listed companies encouraging the adop-
tion of GRI reporting framework in 2010, with a clear
implication that such reporting would become manda-
tory at some point.
This NGO-driven networked approach of the GRI con-
trasts with other disclosure initiatives in which interest
groups ask governments to make regulatory changes.
Institutional investor groups, potential users of corporate
nonﬁnancial reporting, have been instrumental in creat-
ing pressures for regulatory action on corporate climate
change risk disclosures. United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require corporations to
disclose information on material risks (i.e., likelihood that
investors would ﬁnd that information useful in their vot-
ing or investment decisions). However, until recently, cli-
mate change material risks were not explicitly speciﬁed
in the rules. From 2007, investor groups began to pres-
sure the SEC to provide clariﬁcation on corporate climate
change risk disclosures. In January 2010, the SEC
released an interpretative guidance on climate change
disclosures, specifying conditions under which disclo-
sures of climate change risks would be obligatory for
businesses. The SEC speciﬁed conditions that could cre-
ate material risks for businesses which included the
impact of national legislation and regulation, impact of
international accords, indirect consequences of regula-
tion or business trends, and the physical impact of cli-
mate change (SEC, 2010). While the SEC guidelines were
not new rules, the implication was that the SEC would
now be paying more attention to climate change risks
data when reviewing businesses’ disclosures. As such,
businesses wanting to avoid trouble with the US regula-
tor would need to disclose climate change risks.
Several disclosure-based mechanisms explicitly aim to
use information to mitigate climate change by inducing
behavioral change. The CDP and CARMA, for example,
aim to mobilize their potential users to push corpora-
tions to change their behavior, speciﬁcally by acknowl-
edging and then reducing their carbon emissions. But
just how effective are such strategies? As of 2009, the
CDP garners carbon emissions reports (among other
information) from nearly 2,500 organizations in some 60
countries. It makes these requests for information on
behalf of some 534 institutional investors, which
Disclosures in Global Energy Governance
149
Global Policy (2011) 2:SI ª 2011 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
between them have $64 trillion under management
(CDP, 2009). Because the CDP speaks on behalf of a mas-
sive pool of investors, companies take its requests for
information seriously. The process that companies then
undertake to assess their own carbon emissions forces
them to pay attention to what they had previously
thought of as a free externality, and may induce them to
mitigate those emissions, either to reduce waste or to
head off potential regulation. However, studies have
found that the methodology used by corporations to
derive emissions estimations differed and so the data
compiled were often not comparable (Kolk et al., 2008;
Southworth, 2009). As such, the CDP reports do not yet
meet the fundamental standard of providing information
that is simultaneously relevant, comprehensive and avail-
able in a form that allows the appropriate audience eas-
ily to use it to compare across disclosers. Thus, CDP
disclosures may not foster pressure on corporations from
consumers, investors or NGOs to constrain their GHG
emissions.
Under the rubric of CARMA, the Center for Global
Development, a leading policy research organization
based in Washington, DC, has assembled what its web-
site describes as ‘a massive database containing informa-
tion on the carbon emissions of over 50,000 power
plants and 4,000 power companies worldwide’. CARMA
does not ask companies to provide the data. Instead, it
accesses ofﬁcial emissions reports in the US, Canada, the
European Union and India, and also does its own esti-
mates to cover emissions from nonreporting plants.
CARMA enables its database users to rank power plants
based on the carbon emissions numbers for a given geo-
graphical area, and also to make comparisons for local,
regional, national and global power plants in a user-
friendly format.
In this way, CARMA views its database primarily as ‘a
tool for citizen action’ (Wheeler and Ummel, 2008, p. 1).
CARMA’s launching of its database received much media
attention, and provoked an immediate response by acti-
vists – for instance, four days after its database release,
protesters from Greenpeace occupied a coal plant in
Australia after CARMA ranked Australia’s power-related
CO2 emissions as being the world’s highest per capita
(MacDonald, 2007). CARMA’s user-friendly informational
database appears to be a good instrument to help spur
public activism on environmentally unfriendly corporate
activities. But complaints about the accuracy of CARMA’s
data quickly surfaced, raising questions about the valid-
ity of CARMA’s estimations methodology for use in rank-
ings of power plants. A day after CARMA’s release of its
database, China Light and Power (CLP) announced that
CARMA’s data on its power plants were inaccurate, and
that emissions from a power plant it no longer operated
had been included in the overall emissions tally. CLP
provided its audited carbon emissions data to CARMA,
which updated its database to reﬂect the new informa-
tion. The revised overall emissions data for CLP showed
approximately a 21.7 per cent reduction from CARMA’s
original estimate (Wheeler and Ummel, 2007). The con-
sulting group Performeks has also analyzed CARMA’s
methodology, and concluded that emissions data should
not be used for ranking of power plants since they con-
tained widespread errors (for more on this see Afsah and
Ness, 2008).
Improving democratic processes
Citizens’ access to governmental information is an essen-
tial part of the democratic process. However, a number
of developing and energy-rich countries lack proper ave-
nues for information ﬂows between government and the
citizenry, either because democratic systems are nonexis-
tent or the political infrastructures and capacity are too
weak. Disclosure initiatives that aim to improve demo-
cratic processes for better energy governance outcomes
do so by providing citizens with access to governmental
information. Disclosure mechanisms to promote govern-
mental transparency necessarily have to engage the gov-
ernments themselves.
One way of improving democratic processes for better
energy governance is to create avenues for citizen
feedback and participation in electricity sector decision
making and processes. Poverty reduction through mod-
ernization is an important objective for developing coun-
tries. Since electricity access is linked to modernization,
reforms in the electricity sector are on the government
agenda of most developing countries. But often electric-
ity reforms are undertaken without adequate public
information on planning and processes. And when elec-
tricity reforms are implemented by a select group of pol-
iticians, technocrats and advisers from the international
ﬁnancial institutions, they do not necessarily consider
the social and environmental impacts of their decisions
(Dubash and Williams, 2006). When there is little oppor-
tunity for citizens to provide feedback and participate in
decision making on issues that impact them, policy deci-
sions can be ineffective in the long run. For instance,
electricity price increases due to reforms can dispropor-
tionately impact low-income consumers leading to dis-
contentment, or privatization of state electricity utilities
can shift the focus to making proﬁts and supersede the
need to provide energy services to rural or isolated
regions.
Transparency advocates argue that such negative
energy governance outcomes could be minimized or
avoided if all of the stakeholders, including electricity
consumers and civil society, were involved in the deci-
sion-making process through an open and transparent
process because public involvement in decision making
can produce substantially improved governmental
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decisions (Nakhooda et al., 2007). Transparency can also
help to explain the motivations behind reforms and pol-
icy changes. Open processes enable the citizenry to base
their assessment of proposed electricity reforms or
changes to energy services on freely available informa-
tion rather than rumors or speculation, and this can form
a basis for obtaining public support on difﬁcult electric-
ity reforms. However, for the citizenry to be able to
understand and provide balanced feedback, and to scru-
tinize governmental decision making on electricity
reforms, they ﬁrst need to have access to the relevant
information.
One global civil society effort to promote transpar-
ency, inclusiveness and accountability in decision making
in the electricity sector is the Electricity Governance Ini-
tiative. Headed by the World Resources Institute in the
US, and the Prayas Energy Group in India, the EGI brings
together local civil society groups, policy makers, regula-
tors and other electricity sector actors in developing
countries. In 2004, the EGI, with inputs by NGOs and
electricity sector experts, developed an indicator ‘toolkit’
made up of 63 research questions that aim to assess the
level of good governance within a country’s electricity
sector. For each research question, indicator values ran-
ging from low to high are assigned, along with analytical
explanations for the assigned value. Primarily, the assess-
ment seeks to determine whether a country’s electricity
sector policy and decision-making process takes into
account four key components of good governance:
transparency, public participation, accountability and
capacity (Dixit et al., 2007). It also assesses the institu-
tional capacity of the electricity sector to handle the
identiﬁed good governance traits. Additionally, of partic-
ular consideration in the EGI assessment is how political
and regulatory processes in a country affect social and
environmental issues. Since 2005, local civil society
groups in developing countries such as Indonesia, Thai-
land, the Philippines, Brazil, Central Asia and South Africa
have partnered with the EGI to conduct assessments
using the EGI ‘toolkit’. The assessments take place in
close consultation with an advisory board made up of
government ofﬁcials and representatives from the state
or private sector utilities. By including government and
private sector voices, the EGI aims to promote cross-
sectoral dialogue. Based on the country assessment, the
EGI then provides recommendations on how to improve
electricity sector governance.
The EGI functions by forming partnerships with local
civil society groups. It also directly engages the holders
of information, that is, the governments. But since the
EGI is not about providing information to citizens
directly, it has to work on inﬂuencing (or convincing)
governments of the need to adopt transparent practices
in energy sector decision making. So as a disclosure
mechanism, the EGI’s ability to effect pressure on
governments to change is constrained when citizens are
not necessarily more empowered as a result of the EGI
assessments. Conceivably, local civil society groups asso-
ciated with the EGI could mobilize citizens based on the
results of the EGI assessment to pressurise governments
for more transparency. However, the EGI partnerships
are not meant to mobilize the citizenry, but rather to
inﬂuence government. And since citizens are not drivers
for change, EGI recommendations for increased transpar-
ency would require governmental initiation and coopera-
tion to be implemented. But it remains to be seen on
what basis governments could be convinced to change
willingly without external pressures from the citizenry or
political inﬂuence.
Another disclosure initiative that aims to improve
democratic processes does so by empowering citizens
with information so as to curb public corruption and
hold government accountable. Over the past decade,
both civil society groups and governments have put for-
ward proposals for disclosure initiatives aimed at the
‘extractive industries’, which include key oil and natural
gas components as well as mining. Oil and natural gas
are buried beneath land and sea, and must be extracted
before they can be burned to provide energy. The land
and coastal seabed areas from which they are extracted
are under the control of national governments, which
either directly own the extracting ﬁrms or engage in
contracts with them. Those contracts involve enormous
sums of money – yet most of the relevant countries are
plagued by extraordinary levels of poverty and ineffec-
tive and ⁄or repressive governments. The phenomenon is
so widespread that it has come to be called the
‘resource curse’ – the tendency of resource wealth to be
associated with high levels of corruption and poverty.2
Because extractive industries must go where the goods
they wish to extract are, they often operate in weakly
governed but resource-rich developing countries, where
they are often accused of operating in collusion with
corrupt ofﬁcials. The 2008 version of the Transparency
International Bribe Payer’s Index ranked the oil and gas
sector as third worst (out of 20) in terms of likelihood
that ﬁrms would attempt to bribe public ofﬁcials (Trans-
parency International, 2008).
At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment in Johannesburg, South Africa, then UK prime min-
ister, Tony Blair, proposed that extractive industries and
governments alike should publicly disclose audited state-
ments of the payments the ﬁrms make to the govern-
ments of the countries where they operate. The
resulting Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative cov-
ers oil, gas and mining. The aim of the EITI is to involve
governments, ﬁrms and civil society. The idea is that
ﬁrms report their taxes and payments publicly, and gov-
ernments publish their accounts of taxes and payments
received from the same industries, thus making it
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possible to compare accounts – and not incidentally, to
give citizens an understanding of the size of the revenue
streams coming into their countries.
The EITI functions by engaging governments as well
as companies, civil society groups, investors and interna-
tional organizations in its aim to promote governmental
transparency. The weight of such wide networks can be
inﬂuential in attracting country participants, as well as
big oil and gas companies. The EITI now boasts 28 ‘can-
didate’ member countries, ranging from Afghanistan to
Zambia, which have met various indicators for demon-
strating serious commitment to improving relevant dis-
closure (EITI, 2009). Such issues do not affect only
developing nations – Norway is a candidate member of
the EITI, and in April 2010 the United States Senate For-
eign Relations Committee approved S. 2971, the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, which included policy lan-
guage on extractive industry transparency.
There have been various instances of extractive
companies being affected ﬁnancially by consumer and
activist reactions to negative publicity over unethical
business dealings. So there is a vested interest for com-
panies to abide vigilantly by EITI reporting once they
sign on. But as to whether the EITI has much impact on
actually reducing governmental corruption and empow-
ering citizens to hold their governments accountable, to
date there is little clear evidence.
Conclusions
The wide array of disclosure-based approaches to
energy governance reﬂects varied efforts to grapple
with the multiple and rapidly changing demands of
energy governance in the context of sweeping global
changes. Because of the shift to private provision of
what had previously been a whole range of public
goods and services, including energy, the energy sector
became part of a broader debate on good governance,
accountability and push for greater transparency. Trans-
parency is called for to improve oil market efﬁciency
and to improve democratic processes toward better
energy governance outcomes. And the failure to negoti-
ate an enforceable climate change regime has seen dis-
closure-based attempts to alter corporate behavior in
regards to climate change externalities by means of car-
bon and climate change risks disclosures.
Does disclosure work? The answer depends on what
disclosure initiatives are intended to accomplish, and
how they are designed and implemented. The disclosure
initiatives looked at in this article adopt different strate-
gies to achieve their objectives, by mobilizing users of
information and ⁄or holders of information.
JODI mobilizes the holders of information, that is, the
governments of both oil-producing and consuming
countries, to provide information on their oil reserves.
Yet, we have seen considerable reluctance on the part of
some governments to release data. Some states may
even beneﬁt from a less transparent system, at least in
the short term. Thus, JODI’s model based on voluntary
disclosures without formal sanctions to incentivize coun-
try compliance has had limited impact to date.
As a disclosure mechanism, the GRI inﬂuences change
in corporations not so much by its users’ change in
behavior, but rather through its strategy of engagement
and building of networks with a myriad of organizations
including the corporations themselves, as well as regula-
tory agencies. As the GRI gains legitimacy through these
networks, more corporations may be inﬂuenced (or pres-
sured) to get on board. This strategy has perhaps the
best potential to increase demand incrementally for
standardized GRI-styled nonﬁnancial reporting. The GRI
continues to develop its networks. Most recently, the
GRI along with the UK-based Accounting for Sustainabil-
ity Project (A4S) initiated an international committee to
develop a globally accepted framework for Environmen-
tal, Social and Governance (ESG) reporting that can be
eventually adopted by regulators. And regulatory
involvement can help create the necessary conditions
that would make climate change-related disclosures a
mainstream corporate practice. The US SEC’s recent
interpretative guide on climate change risks disclosure
will now make it difﬁcult for public companies to argue
that climate change potential impacts or impending
regulations are not material to their business. The SEC
signal is clear: corporate consideration of climate change
risks is to be factored into public disclosures.
However, not all disclosure mechanisms that engage
holders of information in order to effect change via
building of networks can be similarly effective. The EITI
and EGI, both initiated by western-inﬂuenced civil society
actors and governments, primarily engage governments
in developing countries or countries that lack democratic
systems. Thus, they already face an uphill task in creat-
ing imperatives for real change simply via disclosures.
And with the rise of major powers that do not share
western assumptions about the inherent value of demo-
cratic norms of transparency and governmental account-
ability, it is not clear to what degree major initiatives
such as the EITI can serve as truly global systems of
energy governance.
Disclosure initiatives to alter corporate behavior – spe-
ciﬁcally, to induce companies to reduce their carbon
emissions – primarily mobilize users of information, that
is, investors, activists or consumers. The users of informa-
tion then create pressures or incentives for corporate
change in behavior: investor demands for corporate for-
ward-looking action, consumer demands for ‘cleaner’
products and services, or reputational concerns. This
type of regulation by disclosure, increasingly common in
the environmental arena, has particularly demanding
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design requirements. Whether instigated by civil society
actors or governments, the programs to date have not
satisfactorily addressed these requirements.
Greenhouse gas emissions form a particularly challeng-
ing arena for the use of disclosure-based mechanisms,
both technically and politically. Initiatives that aim to
help solve the climate change conundrum must be
assessed in terms of what information they disclose,
using what metrics, to whom, whether the form in which
the information is disclosed has meaning for the tar-
geted audience, and whether the initiative is targeting
an audience likely to be able and willing to take action
in response to the disclosure. To create strong demand
for corporate change on the part of external forces such
as consumers or investors, carbon disclosure systems
would need to produce easily comparable (and largely
quantitative) and easily understood data that would
enable investors, consumers, governments and ⁄or citi-
zens to make judgments between ﬁrms and thus pro-
vide incentives for changes in ﬁrm behavior. For
instance, CARMA’s effectiveness as a driver of change
depends on the credibility of its assessments of speciﬁc
companies and power facilities. But its methodological
limitations raise questions about the accuracy of
CARMA’s assessments. It is not clear to what degree
CARMA’s assessments provide incentives for those com-
panies and facilities to alter their carbon emissions; users
of CARMA would ﬁrst need to be assured that the data
they utilize to base their decisions on are an accurate
reﬂection of reality. Without this assurance, user behavior
would not change and, thus, corporations would not be
compelled to change their own behavior accordingly,
rendering CARMA’s disclosure-based strategy ineffective.
To date, standards to drive user change in behavior
have not been met in the carbon disclosure initiatives. It
is possible that participation in the disclosure initiatives
may lead to internal ﬁrm learning about alternative more
climate-friendly processes that can generate equal or
greater proﬁts, but to our knowledge no studies have
yet rigorously assessed internal ﬁrm responses to disclo-
sure initiatives.
Overall, the future of disclosure-based global energy
governance is hard to predict. The approach is still quite
new and is experiencing signiﬁcant teething pains. A
plethora of initiatives has aimed to develop metrics and
key performance indicators (for example, Paciﬁc Cities
Sustainability Initiative, AccountAbility, Initiative for
Responsible Investment),3 although much work remains
to be done.
But as the cliché ‘information is power’ implies, disclo-
sure-based governance will never be a purely techno-
cratic, apolitical exercise. Disclosure is not an alternative
to regulation; it is simply a different form of regulation
(albeit one that can be carried out to some extent on a
voluntary and self-regulatory basis). As such, it bears all
the usual concerns about regulation – the potential for
regulatory capture (who decides what will be disclosed
and to whom?); the importance of ensuring a net posi-
tive public beneﬁt (does the disclosure system bring
about changes in corporate behavior that are worth the
costs of the system?); and the importance of setting
appropriate priorities.
Notes
1. See Brown et al., 2009, for a good overview on the GRI’s rise as
a leading framework for corporate sustainability reporting.
2. Although discussions of the resource curse, and initiatives that
aim to turn the curse into more of a blessing, generally lump
oil and gas extraction together with mining of minerals, for the
purposes of this article the mining issues will be disregarded.
3. Paciﬁc Cities Sustainability Initiative is developing a guidebook
to municipal sustainability for cities of the Paciﬁc Rim; Account-
Ability has developed principles and standards that corpora-
tions can use in developing its ESG reporting and sustainable
outlook; the Initiative for Responsible Investment, at Harvard
University, has developed a method for identifying key perfor-
mance indicators on sustainability in different sectors in 2010.
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